We present a new para.digm for the development of trustworthy systems.
Introduction
Anyone presented with our current pa.radigm for producing trustworthy syskms, as, e.g., presented in [5] , would wonder how the pa.ra.digm relat.es t.o the properties we would rea.lly like our syst.ems t.o ha.ve. Nowhere in [5] is there a. discussion of why desidera.ta. are bundled the way they are, how propert.ies and techniques for verifying tha.t syst,eins possess these properties are supposed to drive up t,he cost of penet,ra.ting a system, or how we can produce systems tha.t sa.tisfy the criteria in a cost-effective manner. This pa.per examines the current para.digm and presents a. new paradigm for producing trustworthy systems t1la.t is derived from considerations of wha.t we would like t,o have from our systems. We then put, fort,11 specific research proposals to implement, the required paradigm shift in four a.reas: trust. a.nalysis, syst,em propert,y and specifica.tion development, refinement. met~hodol-ogy, and composability logic.
Our Current Paradigm
Our current pa.radigm for producing secure systems, as exemplified by [5] , consists of t,rying t.0 specify some ideal of securit.y, for example, a.ccess cont,rol,* and, depending on the level of trust required, spend varying amounts of money a.ssuring tha.t the ideal policy has heeii implement.ed in he syst,em. At t,liis point, in the process, covert. clia.nnel and peiiet,rat,ion analyses are performed.
One obvious l~roblem wit.11 t,he current. al>l3roach is it.s exclusive focw on co~~fitle~~t~iality: it contains no int.egrity or ava.ilal,ilit,y reqliirm1ents.
A second I~rol~lem is t.lia.t its securit.? levels are t.00 coarse-graiucxl.
As wo move from lower t.0 higher evaluation Icvels nit bin it., funct.ionality requiremenk (such as audit,ing), confdentiality requirements, and assurance requirements all increase. It is unc1ea.r why increases in funct.ionalit,y, confideut.ialit.y, and assuraoce should be bundled.+ What is most unclear is why comp1et.e assura.nce is not required a.t every level. II. is hard enough to find a. sequence of propert.ies PI, , P,, such t.hat. penct,rat,-ing a syst.eln with Pj+l is cost.lirr t.lian Iwiwt rat.ing a system wit.11 Pj. even wit,liout, having to iiicorpora.te considerations r&ct.ing t.he fact that. t.hc' likelihood hat, a. syst.em actually has 1)rolwrt.y P; n1a.y diffw from t,he likeli1iood t.liat, it. has propert,y Pi+l.
RIorc (,o t,he point,, there is no reason t,o a.ssuine tha.l a securit,y problem missed aft.er having spent $I, on demoiist,ra.ting that it has some property Pi will cost, subst. 1993ACMO-89791-635-2 Padula (BLP) [2] , d o note preclude the possibility of covert channels in systems that conform to them even when explicitly supplemented to include restrictions on changing security levels [12] . Although Noninterference [6] does a better job with respect to storage channels, it fails to detect timing channels a,nd to protect upgraded input [13] . Further, its application is restricted to deterministic systems, and, more seriously, to deterministic specifications. This makes it all but unusable for many real systems. Nondeterministic versions of Noninterference based on possibilistic trace models, such as Nondeducibilit,y [17] a.nd Restrictiveness [lo] , address only nonprobabilistic (i.e., noise-free) storage channels and still fail to protect upgraded input [13] . These models lea.ve t,he clet.ection of probabilistic storage cha.nnels and all timing channels to a, later sta.ge in system development..
Alt.hough there are models tl1a.t elimina.te all channels from systems that conform to them, for example FM and PNI [7, 13] , and techniques for proving tl1a.t systems satisfy these models [8] , these models aad verification techniques are still in the research sta.ge.
The problem with a.ny model tha.t lea.ves t,he detection of (some cla.ss of) covert, cha.nnels until aft,ei system coding is tl1a.t the cost, of elimina.ting any channels detected at t,his sta.ge of soft,wa.re development ca.u be prohibitively expensive. This st,ems from a. va.riet.y of reasons: (1) the improvement in hardwa.re a.nd the increase in multiprocessor a.rchitect.ures tha,t permit the construction of extremely fast (e. g., over 750,000 bits/second timing channels), (2) the fa.ct tl1a.t eliminating covert cha.nnels can require an ent,ire architecture to be redrawn, and (3) the fa.ct t,ha.t ma.king changes to any computer system is va.stly (75 times or grea.ter) more expensive after code has been produced than during the specifica.tion phase [3] . It, is ironic t.hat. one of the ea.rly motivations for using formal met,hods was as a cost saving mea.sure. Formal specifica.t.ion, by supporting early error det,ection, wa.s supposed t.o drive down development cost,s. By lea.ving t,he detection of a large class of security fla.ws unt,il the end of the development process, the cost adva.ntage of using formal specifications is grea,tly reduced.
The problem is not simply tl1a.t models such as BLP and Restrictiveness are not perfect, but. tl1a.t. once we ha.ve proven that a system sat,isfies one of t.hese models, we don't know what we really ha.ve. We can be confident that a. system t,hat. sa.tisfies BLP is secure with respect to a.ccess cont.rol. but, we know not,hing about covert channels-their presence, their ca.pacit,y, their ease of exploita.tion, the t,ype of dat.a. a.t risk, et,c. Restrictiveness a.ddresses only noiseless st,orage cha.nnels. Like BLP, it gives us no informat,ion a.t. all about the channels that may remain--timing channels and probabilistic storage channels. Since a noisy clia.nnel can very easily have a. higher capa.cit,y t,han a noiseless channel, we can conclutl~ very lit.tle about, our system. In fact, it. wasn't unt,il recently t,hat t,ecliniques even existed for computing t.he capacit,y of noisy timing channels [ 161.
This problem is compounded by the fact tha.t many refinement methodologies do not preserve the properties specified in our models [9] . Functiona.lly correct implement,at.ions of possibilist.ic models, such as Nondeducibility or Restrict.iveness, do not, necessarily preserve t.he security propert.ies of these models. Although t.here is. a.t least., one refinement t,echnique t.1ia.t. preserves confitlent.ialit~y requirements.
viz. one based on ca.ll-based trace specificat.iou [l, ll] . applicat,ion of this method t.0 securit.y is st.ill in bhe Icsearch st.age [14, 15] .
A New Paradigm
In an ideal world where t.he cost of securit.y t.echnology is nt~gligible, we would fit~ltl only syst.elns t.hat. could provably satisfy our most. stringent. security requirements.
IIowever. in any it1ea.l world t,hal. is obt,ainable, we must, take int.0 account, t,hat, assurauct' ca.ii come only at. a. cost. In such a. world. we should be able t,o det,ermine the va.lue of informat.ion t.hat is at st.ake in a computer syst,em, the resources at. a penet,rat,or's disposa,l, the cost, of implemeut,ing various t,ypes of security propert,ies, the cost. incurred by a. penetrat,or breaking int,o systems wit.11 t.hose prop&ies. and the cost. incurred by an agent, learning t.lle informat.iou in a. way t.1ia.t tlocs not, i1ecessit.at.e brt,a.king the system. For example, when buying a lock. one must. t.akr ilIt. account, t.he value of t.he goods being prot.t>ct.ctl I,? the lock, t.he type of int.ruclers we art' cot~ct~rncd about, (e. g., professional t.hieves or curious children). t.he cost. of t.he various locks available. t.he ~pense incurred by someone successfully brea.king t.he va.rious locks, and t,he cost of ga,ining ent,ry wit,hout. breaking the lock (e.g., by bribing t.he key keeper). Rc>sea.rch whose t.ask is to satisfy these desires fa.lls untlt~r t hr pro\.ince of t,rust analysis.
Not only must. we be able to compllt.e t.hc relevant. cost,s, we must. be able t.o spt,cify ant] build syst.tWls t.hat. fit. our needs as tlt~t.erminecl by 0111' cost. calculations. That. is, for any dollar figure. say 11. WC should like to be able to specify a syst.em t.hat would cost. $11 t.o brea.k and less t.han $11 t.0 build. (llow much less will? of course, depend on t.he 1ikrlihootl t.hat, somcbocly will attempt to break into the syst,em.) We must also be prepared to accept the fa.ct 6ha.t we shall want some systems to be unbreakable.
When we turn from simple locks to computers, things become more complicat,ed.
We must first be able to specify a variety of trust types and a variety of security properties that enforce these trust types. Roughly, each trust type t would correspond t,o the resources a penetrator could be expected to expend trying to break a system that cont,ained the information, and the corresponding set. of properties Pt would be sufficient to guarantee that, it would cost, more to break the system than a penet.ra.tor would be willing to spend. However, there is no reaSon to assume that these types will be linea.rly ordered.
We may be interested in a system whose conficlent.ia.litSy is very ha.rd to break (although not unbreakable), whose conficlentiality can be broken only by lea.ving a t.ra.il, whose integrity is unbreaka.ble, a.nd whose availabi1it.y ca.n be compromised for only short, periods of t,ime.t There is no obvious dominance rela.tion bet,ween such a. system and one whose confident.ia1it.y is unbrea.kable but, which ca,n be unavailable for long periods of t.ime. Obviously, we must also develop met.hods for showing, in some sense, that Ptj is the correct. set of properties for trust type t and verifica.tion t,ecbniques t,o show t,ha.t a. system designed to process informa.tion of t,ype t. sa.tisfies the set of properties Pt. Once we have an adequa.te set of securit,y properties, we must be able to build a syst.en-1 t,ha.t implements specific security requiremei1t.s with high assurance at a reasonable cost,. M'e believe that this ca.n be accomplished only by developing formal met,hods tha.t allow us to specify and reason about a.11 securit.yrelevant aspects of system beha.vior (including time) and that allow us to rea.son about, composit,ions of specifications.
The latter a.bilit,y will allow us t,o use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) softwa.re, making assurance cost-effective.
It will require us t,o limit, ourselves to user interface specificat.ion.5, as opposed, e.g., to state machine models that, discuss implement.a.t.ioll constraint)s.
We cannot lea.ve out the cost. of developing sol%-ware, however, since COTS soft.ware ma.y not. meet, certain requirements and since even though the cost of COTS software will be dist.ribut,ed over many systems, it does not come for free. We can no longer build systems and then look for secr1rit.y lla.ws in t,he completed system. Experience shows t,hat the cha.nges nec- 12. We need methods that address the composability problem with respect to specification and verification;
13. We need validation methods that catch security flaws before they are too expensive to correct; 14. We need a larger stock of specified, trusted components from which to build trusted systems.
Needs (l)-(3) p re resent limitations for system security in general, not just for security of high assurance systems.
Some of the needs can be met by research alone; others require research accompanied by experimentation and experience. All the needs stem, in some sense, from the fact t.hat much of the local research that has taken place up t.o now in comput,er security has lacked an a.ccura.te, global concept,ion of the ultimate goal. Given the above considera.tions.
we suggest repla.cing the current methodology by a new pa.ra.digm of system development.
To implement, this pa.ra.digm, research needs to focus on four areas: trust a.na.lysis, specification, code development, and va.lida.tion. These areas are described in turn.
With respect to the trust analysis, we must determine how much protection various types of informa.-tion deserve, what sort, of attacks we wish to protect information from (e.g., confident.ia.lit,y viola.tions tl1a.t depend on compromising a. reference monitor, confidentiality violations that depend on covert channels, denial of service attacks, int,egrit.y a.tt.a.cks, etc.), and what sort of system properties will provide this protection.
The relation between informa.t.ion value a.ncl system properties can be found only t~hrougli experience, but it is a. necessary resea.rch direction that must be explored, yet has heretofore been ignored, if we are to have a security development. met.hodology t.hat has a firm footing.
With respect to system specifica,t.ions we must. develop a specification la.ngua.ge sufficient, to capt,ure all the requirements formulated above. This dict.a.tes tl1a.t resea.rch must move a.wa,y from considering specific.ation langua.ges t1ia.t are limit.ed to properties of information flow on noise-free cliannels to specification languages that ca.n a.ddress, a.t the very lea.st,, genera.1 inforination flow, integrity, a.11d ava.ilability. We must. also move away from specifica.t.ion langua.ges t1ia.t are binary, in the sense that a. system is described eit.her as being secure or nonsecure, to langua.ges tl1a.t a.llow us to specify arbitrary sets of requirements that guarantee varying degrees of securit.y. This does not mean that we should not continue work tlla.t is desigued, for example, to capture "perfect con~tlt~nt.ialit,y" [T,13], but tha.t this work should be extended to "perfect securit,y" and to allow for graceful degra.dation of t.hese properties.
To guarantee that. specifica.tions are correctly implemented, we advocat,e the development, of a system refinement methodology.
Such a methodology will replace the current pra.ctice of building a system and then showing that it. meet,s its specifica.tion by one where a system is developed in such a. way t,ha.t it.s specification must. be met.. Tl1is assumes t.ha.t t.he specification addresses all concerns we are int.crested in and does not leave, for example, covert cha.nnel det,ection, until the stage when code is writ,ten. The work described in [14] can serve a.s a st.a.rting point siiice it shows how once a. specifica.tion is proven t.0 sat,isfy certa.in securit.y propert,ies, securit,; concerns cau be ignored during code refinement,/verifica.tion.
Since t,he oiily concern becomes funct,ional correct.ness. t,lie securit,y commu1iit.y cau borrow at will from t.he computer science community at, la.rge. To make such a. pa.ratligm cost. effect.i\:e, WC must clevelop a. set, of conipouent specificatioiis and a logic for reasoniug about them. These specificat.ions will be interfa.ce specifications a.iid the logic will a.llon: us t.0 reason about. composi t.e syst.ems made up from various components.
To simplify the logic, t,he language used t,o specify t,he con1ponent.s should be t,he same as the la.nguage used to specify syst,em requireme1lt.s. We require t.hat the logic lx sound a.nd t.hat. a.ny verification system used t,o support. it. be highly assured. The system described in [l/l] To this end we suggest using the work described in [7, 13] as a starting point. l Modify current specification and verification efforts to address the properties discovered in the above initiative.
The focus here should be the development of refinement methods that yield correct systems rat,lier than the analysis of systems after their development.
The verifica.tion systems developed should be highly a.ssured. We suggest using the work described in [14] a.s a. st.a.rting point. l Develop a set of componenbs that, ca.n be used to implement the systems we desire a.nd a. verification method for rea.soning a.bout. propert.ies of composite systems ma.de up of t,hese components. It would be desirable if t,he composition logic resembled the refinement, logic of the previous bullet.
For this reason we suggest using t,he work described in [15] as a. starting point..
Concluding Remarks
We have suggested init,iating resea.rch in four a.reas: trust analysis, system property and specification development, refinement met~hodology, and composability logic. It should be point,ed out, tl1a.t. t.hese a.re high risk efforts. For example, a.lt,hough recent. espionage cases have shown tha.t the replacement cost. of highly classified informa.tion n1a.y not, be as impossible to compute as some have assumed, we must a.lso ta.ke into account the cost that may result from the loss of prestige that can follow informa.tion theft.
Similarly, as recent debates in the cryptology community have shown, it is unclear how much va.rious properties affect the cost system penet,ra.tiou.
The out.look for security preserving refinement methods a.nd composability logics are not certa.in either. Nevertheless, I do not see any alternative to initia.ting t,his resea.rch. We camlot afford to continue spending so much money on systems yet be so unsure about what our money has bought us in terms of protection.
Bett,er t,o fa.ce the risk of a lifeboat tha.n to stay on a, sinking ship.
